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Abstract 
Introduction: In Japan, participants in the disaster-specific medical transportation system have received ongoing 
training since 2002, incorporating lessons learned from the Great Hanshin Earthquake. The Great East Japan Earth-
quake occurred on March 11, 2011, and the very first disaster-specific medical transport was performed. This article 
reviews in detail the central government’s control and coordination of the disaster medical transportation process 
following the Great East Japan Earthquake and the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant Accident.
Case description: In total, 124 patients were air transported under the coordination of the C5 team in the emer-
gency response headquarter of the Japanese Government. C5 includes experts from the Cabinet Office, Cabinet 
Secretariat, Fire Defense Agency, Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare, and Ministry of Defense. In the 20–30 km 
evacuation zone around the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant, 509 bedridden patients were successfully evacu-
ated without any fatalities during transportation.
Discussion and evaluation: Many lessons have been learned in disaster-specific medical transportation. The 
national government, local government, police, and fire agencies have made significant progress in their mutual com-
munication and collaboration.
Results: Fortunately, hospital evacuation from the 20–30 km area was successfully performed with the aid of local 
emergency physicians and Disaster Medical Assistance Teams (DMATs) who have vast experience in patient transport 
in the course of day-to-day activities. The emergency procedures that are required during crises are an extension 
of basic daily procedures that are performed by emergency medical staff and first responders, such as fire fighters, 
emergency medical technicians, or police officers. Medical facilities including nursing homes should have a plan for 
long-distance (over 100 km) evacuation, and the plan should be routinely reevaluated with full-scale exercises. In 
addition, hospital evacuation in disaster settings should be supervised by emergency physicians and be handled by 
disaster specialists who are accustomed to patient transportation on a daily basis.
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Background
In Japan since 2002, participants in the disaster-specific 
medical transportation system, which include staff of 
local hospitals, emergency department staff, emergency 
medical technicians, police and fire fighters, are con-
sistently trained in exercises for disaster-specific medi-
cal transportation. On March 11, 2011 at 14:46, the 
Great East Japan Earthquake hit the northeastern part 
of mainland Japan. It was the most powerful earthquake 
ever recorded to hit Japan, and the earthquake trig-
gered powerful tsunami waves that reached heights up 
to 40.5 m. The National Police Agency confirmed 15,891 
dead, 6152 injured, and 2584 missing. When this earth-
quake occurred, the very first disaster-specific medical 
transport in Japan was initiated [1]. This article reviews, 
in detail, the central government’s coordination of the 
disaster medical transportation process following the 
Great East Japan Earthquake and the Fukushima Daiichi 
Nuclear Power Plant Accident, and includes the roles and 
actions of the central operation and the lessons learned 
from this disaster. Shimada et al. reported on the hospi-
tal evacuation following the Fukushima nuclear accident 
from the viewpoint of local emergency physicians [2]. In 
this article, we present the government’s coordinating 
role from the viewpoint of central government adminis-
trative officers and lessons learned from the viewpoint of 
governmental disaster management. Recommendations 
for future efforts are discussed.
On the morning of January 17, 1995, the Great Han-
shin (Osaka-Kobe) Earthquake resulted in 6308 deaths 
and 35,000 injuries [3]. In Japan, before the Great Han-
shin Earthquake, disaster medicine and the concept of 
disaster-specific medical transportation were not well 
established. In fact, on the day of the Great Hanshin 
Earthquake, only one trauma patient was transported by 
helicopter from the devastated area to an outside hospi-
tal. In the first 3 days after the Great Hanshin Earthquake, 
only nine patients were transported by helicopters. Many 
critically injured patients were left in the devastated area 
without appropriate trauma care, at least 500 deaths due 
to trauma caused by this disaster were thought to be 
preventable.
In 2000, the Doctor-Heli system was introduced [4]. 
The Doctor-Heli system comprises a helicopter that car-
ries an emergency trauma physician and a nurse with 
emergency medical rescue equipment to the scene of a 
disaster. This prefecture- and government-funded heli-
copter system enables the medical team to begin emer-
gency treatment on-site and during transport to a nearby 
trauma care facility. By 2012, 30 of the 47 prefectures in 
Japan had introduced the Doctor-Heli system.
In 2002, the South Kanto area Great Earthquake table-
top exercise was performed. In this exercise coordinated 
by the Cabinet Office of the Government of Japan, the 
main theme was medical transportation during a disaster 
situation. The Cabinet Secretariat, Cabinet Office, Min-
istry of Health, Labour and Welfare (MHLW), Ministry 
of Defense, and other related ministries made concerted 
and united efforts to communicate and collaborate to 
ensure medical transportation for victims who sustained 
injuries during an earthquake.
Systemization of medical transportation following a 
disaster started with the lessons learned from the Great 
Hanshin Earthquake, in which many persons were died 
without appropriate trauma care; a major contribut-
ing factor was that devastated hospitals were not able 
to provide appropriate trauma care. With these lessons 
learned, DMATs were introduced in 2004 throughout 
Japan. Education and central coordination of DMATs are 
overseen by the MHLW, and the operation and mainte-
nance of DMATs are managed by each prefecture. Mem-
bers of DMATs are emergency trauma physicians, nurses, 
pharmacists, and clerks. Following a disaster, the main 
purpose of the medical transportation system is to save 
the lives of trauma patients and to provide support for 
hospitals that are overwhelmed by casualties. For this 
purpose, DMATs are first gathered at hubs outside the 
disaster area (outer staging care units: outer SCUs) and 
then transported to affected hospitals via hubs inside 
the affected area (inner SCUs). Trauma patients are then 
transported to the outer SCUs via the inner SCUs (Fig. 1).
Medical transportation inside the disaster area is 
mainly done by helicopters, including Doctor-Helis 
and ambulances, and outside the disaster area by fixed-
wing planes of the Self-Defense Forces. Critical patients 
are accompanied by DMATs who continue to care for 
patients during transport.
In 2004, at the time of the Niigata Chuetsu Earthquake, 
a Doctor-Heli was dispatched to the affected area; this 
was the very first disaster mission for the Japanese Doc-
tor-Heli [5]. Since 2004, full-scale exercises of disaster-
specific medical transportation are performed annually. 
Year by year, participants are becoming more adept and 
proficient.
The Cabinet Office has created a manual of the gov-
ernmental emergency response headquarter (ER-HQ). 
According to this manual, ER-HQ is divided into three 
A teams (Integration Teams), three B teams (Informa-
tion Teams), eight C teams (Operation Teams), and five D 
teams (General Affairs Team). The manual also describes 
the teams and roles that are required during disaster 
management (see Table  1). Members of the C5 team 
are from the Cabinet Office, Cabinet Secretariat, Fire 
Defense Agency, MHLW, and Ministry of Defense. They 
are tasked with the specialized coordination of disaster 
medical transportation. In 2007, the Cabinet Secretariat 
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additionally invited an emergency physician to act as a 
government official and consultant.
Case description
Early stage before the Fukushima Daiichi accident: the first 
challenge
Within the Japanese government, the practical business 
of disaster response is the responsibility of the Cabinet 
Office. Immediately after the Great East Japan Earth-
quake happened, the governmental ER-HQ was set up 
by the Cabinet Office headed by the Prime Minister. 
As planned, the C5 team was activated. The consult-
ing emergency physician was dispatched by the Cabi-
net Secretariat to assist the C5 team. All members of 
the C5 team were experts in the field of medical trans-
portation. The initial task of the C5 team was to facili-
tate the establishment of inner SCUs and outer SCUs 
(Fig. 2).
On the night of March 12, transportation of victims 
to the outer SCUs had begun. Figure 3 shows the trans-
portation flow. The Doctor-Heli system also played a 
remarkable role in medical transportation inside the 
affected area. In total, 16 Doctor-Helis came from 
unaffected areas and they treated and transported 149 
critical patients [6, 7].
Disaster transportation was primarily handled by the 
prefectures. When local governments experienced diffi-
culty in the coordination of disaster transportation, they 
could ask the central government for help as needed. 
Otherwise, the head office of DMATs or the MHLW 
requested coordination of disaster transportation. The 
C5 team received requests from any organization, includ-
ing private sectors, and obtained as much information 
as possible. In total, 124 victims were transported by air 
(Table  2). This number does not include the evacuation 
from the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant acci-
dent. Among all the evacuees we coordinated, 19 were 
trauma patients. In the Great East Japan Earthquake, the 
main cause of injuries was the tsunami; while many peo-
ple died, survivors had few or relatively minor injuries 
and few had serious trauma injuries. On the other hand, 
the earthquake and tsunami damaged the hospital in the 
affected area and the demand for transport of patients on 
dialysis and patients with neuro-degenerative diseases 
who required artificial ventilation gradually increased 
over time; 94 patients transported on March 23 were 
Fig. 1 Initially, Disaster Medical Assistance Teams (DMATs) go from the outer staging care units to the inner staging care units. DMATs take patients 
from the inner staging care units to the outer staging care units. Arrows show patient flow. JSDF Japan Self-Defense Force 
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dialysis patients. The last case transported was a patient 
who needed to return home (April 21 in Table 2).
Most of the patients included in the medical transpor-
tation scheme were treated in an unaffected area, recov-
ered, and returned home using the usual transportation 
system. One particular patient stabilized, but required 
continuous treatment and could not return by surface 
transport. The patient and his family wanted to go back 
to the hospital in their hometown and requested air 
transport. Typically, return transportation cases are not 
included in the disaster transportation scheme; however, 
MHLW and the Ministry of Defense negotiated and the 
patient was finally transported by the Aero-Medical Evac-
uation Squadron (AMES) of the Japan Air Self-Defense 
Force. The AMES is a so-called flying intensive care unit. 
This case was the first for the AMES. The AMES uses 
C130H transport aircrafts with Aero-Medical Evacuation 
Units. The AMES may be used for medical evacuation in 
future disaster settings.
During the height of the chaos, the requests for trans-
portation contained confusing information, and dupli-
cated information was often received. For example, a 
prefecture asked to transport 400 dialysis patients, so 
ten buses were designated and prepared for this purpose. 
Table 1 Disaster management teams and  tasks in  the 
ER-HQ of the Japanese Government
Group of teams Team Tasks
A: Integration teams A1 Integration of real-time situations
A2 Tactics building and analysis
A3 Meeting and public relations
B: Information teams B1 Integration of information
B2 Information sharing
B3 Reporting of collected information





C6 Reception of international aid
C7 Sheltering and evacuation
C8 Infrastructure and life lines
D: General affairs D1 Integration of general affairs
D2 Distribution of food and nutritional sup-
plements
D3 Publicity
D4 General affairs and communication
D5 Dispatch of government persons
Fig. 2 Inner staging care units and outer staging care units. The broad cross shows the outer staging care unit and the circle shows the inner staging 
care unit. Dotted areas are the three main earthquake-affected prefectures: Iwate, Miyagi, and Fukushima prefectures
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Fig. 3 Flow of patient air transportation. The earthquake affected Iwate, Miyagi, and Fukushima prefectures. DMAT Disaster Medical Assistance 
Team, HQ headquarters and  AP airport
Table 2 Number of patients air-transported with the coordination of the C5 section
Plane and helicopter  
of the self-defense forces
Fire fighting  
helicopters
Daily account Cumulative 
total value
March 11 0 0
March 12 5 5 5
March 13 11 11 16
March 14 3 3 19
March 15 2 2 21
March 16 0 21
March 17 0 21
March 18 4 4 25
March 19 4 4 29
March 20 0 0
March 21 0 0
March 22 0 0
March 23 94 94 123
March 24 0 0
March 25 0 0
Apr 21 1 1 124
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The same prefecture subsequently sent another request 
for the C5 team to transport 400 patients on dialysis, so 
the C5 team obtained an additional 10 buses, only to have 
both requests cancelled by the prefecture.
After the Fukushima Daiichi accident: the second challenge
The tsunami damaged the Fukushima nuclear power 
plant, and day by day the situation at the power plant 
deteriorated. The most tragic situation in the early stage 
of medical transportation was at Futaba Hospital. Futaba 
Hospital (including Deauville Futaba, an adjunct nursing 
home to Futaba Hospital) was within 5 km of the Fuku-
shima Daiichi nuclear power plant accident and patient 
evacuation was required. During the chaos, Futaba Hos-
pital lost three patients before the morning of March 14, 
and a total of 50 patients by the end of March due to the 
inappropriate medical care circumstances [8]. In the pro-
cess of the evacuation, Futaba Hospital patients were ini-
tially moved to a general evacuation center with healthy 
citizens and subsequently moved to hospitals. Each of 
the four hospitals in the 20-km zone should have had a 
concrete evacuation plan and conducted drills as part of 
a prefectural disaster plan, but in reality only one of these 
hospitals had an evacuation plan.
Finally on March 15, the government decided to define 
the evacuation zone as a 30-km circle around the nuclear 
power plant. At that time, there were 1000 bedridden 
patients in hospitals and nursing homes in the evacua-
tion zone. These 1000 bedridden patients needed trans-
port from the inner area to an outside area as soon as 
possible. This was a difficult task and absolutely beyond 
the capacity of the air transportation scheme. Meanwhile, 
the DMATs had started to withdraw out of Fukushima. 
Originally, the activity period of the DMATs was defined 
as the first 72 h after the disaster. The C5 team requested 
the DMATs to help with this task. In the early stage, real-
time information on the medico-social situation of the 
evacuation zone was lacking; therefore, two members of 
the C5 team including an emergency physician were dis-
patched to the Fukushima governmental headquarters 
(HQ) on March 17. The mission of the two C5 delegates 
was to communicate, coordinate, and collaborate to save 
patients, including the 1000 bedridden patients in the 
20–30 km evacuation zone. When the C5 team members 
reached the prefectural HQ, local government employees 
were trying to match patients from inside SCUs to out-
side SCUs one case at a time. This excessive coordina-
tion proved to be labor-intensive and ineffective. Thus, 
if the medical transportation team were to spend their 
time in this manner, they could never successfully evacu-
ate a large number of patients. Therefore, the C5 delega-
tion decided that the receiving prefecture must accept 
the entire group of patients, knowing only the number of 
patients and distribution of injury severity. The delega-
tion negotiated with the concerned organizations that 
were part of the coalition of the central C5 team. Sur-
rounding prefectures came to terms with this dynamic 
scheme under the strong leadership of the MHLW and 
finally the transportation started to proceed smoothly. 
Figure 4 shows this scheme.
In this scheme, bedridden patients were first collected 
at the screening and triage area. In theory, patients who 
had been in the hospital had no risk of radiation con-
tamination. However, surrounding prefectures that had 
not sustained damage from earthquakes, the tsunami, 
or the nuclear accident were concerned about radioac-
tive contamination on patients. At the 30-km line, radia-
tion screening and triage were established, and DMAT 
and other teams checked the patients for contamination, 
evaluated the physical status of patients, and performed 
triage. According to the patients’ physical status, trans-
portation measures (helicopters, ambulances, buses) 
were selected. Patients who were unable to withstand 
long-distance transportation were sent to the local cen-
tral hospital, Fukushima Prefectural University Hospital. 
As a result, 509 patients were successfully transported 
from inside to outside of the evacuation zone without 
any deaths occurring during transportation. Voluntary 
non-governmental organizations were also engaged in 
transportation from the evacuation zone; unfortunately, 
several deaths were reported during the transporta-
tion, presumably because of inexperience in medical 
transportation.
In Japan, the Fire and Disaster Management Agency 
established a system to allow the central government to 
request municipal fire brigades to form emergency res-
cue teams in the event of large-scale disasters such as 
major earthquakes and accidents at nuclear power plants. 
This scheme was also supported by unaffected local gov-
ernments from all over Japan. Ambulances are not fuel 
efficient and require large quantities of gasoline. The 
C5 team members, in close collaboration with the local 
branch of the Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry, 
were able to maintain sufficient quantities of gasoline. 
The C5 team also coordinated the transportation of med-
ical oxygen cylinders and special drugs such as methylene 
blue, which were needed for the nuclear crisis.
Discussion and evaluation
Many lessons have been learned in disaster-specific 
medical transportation. The national government, local 
government, police, and fire agencies have made sig-
nificant progress in their mutual communication and 
collaboration.
Fortunately, hospital evacuation from the 20–30  km 
area was successfully performed with the aid of local 
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Fig. 4 Evacuation scheme in the Fukushima nuclear evacuation
Table 3 Recommendations for future disaster medical transportation
Recommendations
1. Plan for long-distance evacuation Medical facilities, including nursing homes, should have a plan for long-
distance disaster-specific (over 100 km) evacuation. This plan should be 
practiced with full-scale exercises and when flaws are found, they should 
be evaluated and eliminated
2. Securement of transportation measures and designated hospitals A disaster-specific evacuation plan should include the securement of 
transportation measures and designated hospitals where patients can 
be sent
3. Multiple communication measures Healthcare facilities should have two or three independent communica-
tion measures such as a radio, satellite phone, amateur radio, and multi-
channel access radio systems
4. Supervision by emergency physicians and disaster specialists Hospital evacuation in disaster settings should be supervised by emer-
gency physicians and be handled by disaster specialists who are accus-
tomed to patient transportation on a daily basis
5. Dispatch of central governmental persons to the disaster site Selected members of the central government should not stay in the 
central office waiting for information from the disaster site, but should 
go into the disaster site, get precise information, and make use of the 
information to formulate a governmental response
6. The presence of an emergency physician or disaster researcher in the 
central government
The presence and availability of an emergency physician or disaster 
researcher in the central government can greatly contribute to the gov-
ernmental response, especially for disaster-specific medical transporta-
tion
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emergency physicians and DMATs who have vast expe-
rience in patient transport in the course of day-to-day 
activities. Voluntary non-governmental organizations 
were also engaged in transportation with good inten-
tions, but they lacked experience. Tasks, activities, or 
behaviors that are not performed on a routine basis 
cannot be readily performed during an emergency. The 
emergency procedures that are required during crises are 
an extension of basic daily procedures that are performed 
by emergency medical staff and first responders, such as 
fire fighters, emergency medical technicians, or police 
officers.
Results
The principals in disaster response are the local govern-
ments. One of the most important roles of central gov-
ernment personnel is to resolve impediments faced by 
the local government. To identify these impediments, 
dispatch of central government employees was extremely 
useful. The delegation of the C5 section was dispatched to 
Fukushima for collecting precise medico-social informa-
tion; this became the catalyst for responding to the crisis. 
The central government could then evaluate whether the 
local response system was working smoothly and when 
something was less than optimal the central government 
could step in and offer assistance. Recommendations 
for future medical transportation from lessons learned 
following the Fukushima nuclear accident are shown in 
Table 3.
Footnote
This article presents the authors’ personal opinions 
as emergency physicians/disaster researchers and is 
not intended to be the official position of the Japanese 
government.
Abbreviations
AMES: Aero-Medical Evacuation Squadron; AP: airport; C5: command, control, 
communications, computers, and counter-intelligence; DMAT: Disaster 
Medical Assistance Team; ER-HQ: Emergency Response Headquarter; HQ: 
headquarters; MHLW: Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare; SCU: Staging 
Care Unit; AMES: Aero Medical Evacuation Squadron; JSDF: Japan Self-Defense 
Force.
Authors’ contributions
To engaged in the whole scheme and application of disaster specific medical 
transportation, and described the design and implementation. ST participated 
in the article design and coordination and helped to draft the manuscript. 
Both authors read and approved the final manuscript.
Author details
1 Countermeasures against NBC (Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical) Threats, 
Office of Assistant Chief Cabinet Secretary for National Security and Crisis 
Management, Cabinet Secretariat, Government of Japan, Nagatacho 2-4-12, 
Chiyoda, Tokyo 100-0014, Japan. 2 Verbal Analysis of Pathophysiology, Gradu-
ate School of Medicine, The University of Tokyo, Tokyo, Japan. 
Acknowledgements
The authors gratefully acknowledge all members of the emergency response 
headquarters of the Japanese government, local governments, DMATs, and 
concerned organizations. The authors dedicate this work to the victims and 
their families in the Great East Japan Earthquake and the Fukushima Daiichi 
Nuclear Power Plant Accident.
Competing interests
The authors declare that they have no competing interests.
Received: 8 January 2015   Accepted: 25 August 2015
References
 1. Okumura T. The area wide transportation following the Great East Japan 
earthquake: the Japanese government’s control and coordination. Am J 
Disaster Med. 2013;8:155–6.
 2. Shimada J, Tasei C, Sato M, Miyazaki H, Kogasaka N, Kondo H, et al. Hospi-
tal evacuation due to the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear plant accident. Jpn J 
Disaster Med. 2012;17:142–9 (in Japanese).
 3. Ukai T. The Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake and the problems with 
emergency medical care. Ren Fail. 1997;19:633–45.
 4. Okumura T, Ninomiya N, Okada M. An overview of air medical transport 
in Japan. In: Blumen IJ, Lemkin DL, editors. AMPA principles and direction 
of air medical transport. Salt Lake City: Air Medical Physician Association; 
2006. p. 643–6.
 5. Okumura S, Okumura T, Suwa S. The first ever dispatch of a “Doctor 
Helicopter” for disaster relief in Japan—dispatch of the Eastern Shizuoka 
“Doctor Helicopter” team to the Niigata Chuetsu earthquake. J Jpn Soc 
Aeromed Serv. 2004;5:58–61.
 6. Report on the collaboration between Doctor-Helis and fire-fighting heli-
copters. HEM-Net Report, Tokyo; 2014. http://www.hemnet.jp/databank/
file/20120611001.pdf. Accessed 12 Dec 2015 (in Japanese).
 7. Otsuka N, Yamashita A, Kimura Y, Aimono M, Kobayashi I, Nanba H, et al. 
Experience of DMAT rescue activity by doctor-helicopter in Tohoku Area 
after the earthquake. Masui. 2012;61:771–4 (in Japanese with English 
abstract).
 8. Otsuki N. Government probe: many Fukushima hospital patients 
died during botched rescue operation. The Asahi Shimbun. 24 July 
2012. http://ajw.asahi.com/article/0311disaster/life_and_death/
AJ201207240092. Accessed 5 Jan 2015.
Submit your next manuscript to BioMed Central
and take full advantage of: 
• Convenient online submission
• Thorough peer review
• No space constraints or color figure charges
• Immediate publication on acceptance
• Inclusion in PubMed, CAS, Scopus and Google Scholar
• Research which is freely available for redistribution
Submit your manuscript at 
www.biomedcentral.com/submit
